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There is a rough match between what is good and what we value. The question then is how 
we should explain this overlap. Realists believe that we value good things because our 
evaluations manage to track how good things are independently. In contrast, according to 
constructivists, that we value things confers value upon them. 
 At the moment, there are two main ways in which the constructivist position has been 
developed further.  Sadly, neither one of these is very explicit about the conferring element of 
constructivism. Rather, they mainly focus on how we should understand valuing in such a 
way that it would help us to see how the value of objects depends on our evaluations.  
 The Kantian, rationalist form of constructivism has recently been defended by 
Christine Korsgaard (see, for instance, the essays collected in her The Constitution of Agency 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)). According to this view, valuing an object is 
understood in terms of free willing where this consists of the will conforming to certain 
structural requirements specified by the Categorical Imperative. Furthermore, that one’s will 
has the appropriate universalised form is both constitutive of acting and what makes one an 
agent. Thus, on this view, insofar as you are an agent, you cannot even begin to ask why you 
should will in accordance to the categorical imperative.  
 One traditional worry about constructivism has been that, given that we are able to 
value anything really, almost anything could turn out to be valuable. Korsgaard attempts to 
avoid this problem by arguing that the formal constraints on willing also commit us to value 
certain substantial things – namely, our own humanity. Thus, in so far as we conform to 
them, there are certain substantial things we must value and others we cannot value. 
Korsgaard’s argument to this conclusion is sophisticated and difficult. It is based on the idea 
that, insofar as we consider the things we value to be worth pursuing, we must consider our 
ability to value objects – what we can call our ‘humanity’ – to be valuable in itself. And, 
given that I must consider my humanity to be an end in itself and given that you and everyone 
else have this very same ability, then in order to be consistent I must value everyone’s 
humanity in the same way. 
 The second way of developing the basic idea of constructivism further is both more 
Humean and more relativist. Sharon Street has recently become famous for defending this 
alternative (see her “Constructivism about Reasons,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3 (2008): 
204–45). Street formulates her view by using the notion of reasons but it is easy to translate 
her view to value-talk. On this view, the kind of valuing that is able to confer value upon 
objects is valuing that can withstand scrutiny from the perspective of one’s other evaluative 
judgments. That is, according to Street, we first come to make judgments about how good 
things are. These judgments, which Street assumes to be basic, are neither standard beliefs 
(because they are motivational) nor desires (because certain stricter normative standards such 
as if you value a goal you must also value the means to it apply to them). If a given judgment 
about the value of an object then coheres with an agent’s other evaluative judgments, then 
this makes the object good relative to that agent. The same story can be then told about the 
value of every valuable object. In each case, the value of the object consists of the fact that 
the judgment about that object’s value is supported by the agent’s other evaluative judgments. 
 Street offers various motivations for this view, but two of the arguments are most 
significant. The first claims that we cannot give up our evaluative perspectives and ask 
whether the objects of our evaluative judgments really are valuable. If we gave up our 
evaluative perspectives, then no standards would remain that we could use to answer this 
question.  Street’s second argument provides an evolutionary explanation for our realist 
evaluative intuitions according to which the value of certain things is not based on what we 
value. However, if our realist intuitions are based on the way in which we have been 
hardwired biologically and not on evidence, then we have no reason to believe in independent 
objective values. 
 In one way or another, the thirteen essays in Constructivism in Practical Philosophy 
defend, criticize, and develop both the general idea of constructivism and the two Kantian 
and Humean forms of constructivism, which I just briefly sketched above. In the following, I 
will quickly summarise the main cruxes of these essay. I will then make few overall 
observations about the book. 
 R. Jay Wallace investigates three problems of Korsgaard’s constructivism. The main 
one of these is based on how constructivists could accommodate the fact that we sometimes 
make mistaken evaluative judgments. The traditional answer to this question is that, in these 
cases, we fail to satisfy the procedural standards for making judgments of the given 
constructivist view. However, we can then ask what makes those standards authorative for 
us? If it is our own endorsement, then we could avoid error by simply endorsing different 
standards. If it is something else, then it is not clear how constitutive the view is in the end. 
Finally, Wallace also suggests that the procedural norms constitutive of agency cannot create 
any interesting substantial evaluative conclusions (35).  
 Sharon Street’s article criticizes Korsgaard’s argument to the conclusion that the 
constitutive standards of valuing commit us to valuing certain particular things. Her main 
argument is based on the idea that, when at the crucial stage of her argument Korsgaard asks 
whether there are any reasons to value anything at all, she is trying to ask this question from a 
perspective which abstracts away from all our evaluative attitudes. However, Street argues 
that, from this perspective, this question no longer makes sense. We can only ask what there 
is reason to value from the standpoint of what we value. Thus, for Street, practical enquiry is 
always an attempt to make our evaluative judgments coherent. This leads to a certain degree 
of contingency and relativism which is both unavoidable and benign. 
 Aaron James begins by helpfully explaining certain distinguishing features of 
constructivism. He then argues that the activity of making reasoned practical judgments (that 
is, of making choices) is governed by certain constitutive norms that specify when this 
activity is done well or poorly. You understand these norms when you understand what the 
activity in question is. According to James’ constructivism, we can then use the output of 
good reasoned practical judgments to understand what is good. 
 Michael Bratman focuses on developing Street’s constructivism further from the 
perspective of action theory. He argues that the truth of a given evaluative judgment cannot 
only depend on whether it withstands scrutiny from the perspective of the agent’s evaluative 
judgments. Firstly, some of our evaluative judgments fail to be part of our practical 
standpoints. Secondly, we should also take into account our other commitments to treat 
certain things as reasons. These commitments are based on what we love and intend.  
 Dale Dorsey too attacks Street’s view. Dorsey first observes that Street fails to give an 
account of the content of evaluative judgments – what it is to judge that something is good. 
This is because she explicitly relies on evaluative judgments that already must have content 
when specifying which of these judgments are true. However, on standard views about 
meaning, there is a correlation between what content judgments have and when they are true. 
This means that, according to Dorsey, Street must accept an unorthodox, non-semantic theory 
of truth such as the coherence theory. 
 Robert Stern investigates different ways in which Kantian constructivists have tried to 
use the notion of autonomy to argue for their position. The idea is that, if value were not 
conferred upon things by us, this would undermine autonomy, that is, our ability to govern 
ourselves. Thus, the requirements based on value of things that bind us must be our own 
making, or so the constructivists have argued. Stern argues that, when we study closely what 
moves realists and constructivists can make here, we will see that there is more common 
ground between these positions than often assumed. 
 Michael Ridge focuses on whether Street’s constructivism is a distinct metaethical 
position. According to him, this depends on just how Street understands the evaluative 
judgments that are used to test whether a given target-judgment withstands scrutiny. These 
judgments cannot be mere sensations, beliefs (what would be their content?), or so-called 
‘besires’ (there just aren’t any). The only option then is that these judgments are desire-like 
attitudes. The problem is that this alternative collapses the view into familiar form of 
subjectivism. What is good ultimately turns out to be a function of what the agent wants on 
this view. 
 Yonatan Shemmer’s article attempts to show how we can come to have reasons to be 
more coherent on the basis of our contingent desires and the constitutive requirements of 
consistency. He then uses the analogy of constitutional democracy to illuminate what role 
these reasons for coherence can have in our planning. 
 Nadeem Hussain argues that ambitious forms of metanormative constructivism suffer 
from a souped up version of Russell’s Bishop Stubbs objection to coherentism. The problem 
is that constructivism leads to a vicious regress. This is based on the thought the fact that a 
certain normative proposition is an outcome of a normatively specified procedure is itself a 
normative proposition. If true, it too is then required to be an outcome of a further normative 
procedure, which itself is a further normative proposition which too must be a result of a 
normative proposition, and so on. The problem is that we can construct equally good infinite 
chains of procedures for the negation of the original normative proposition. Thus, it’s not 
clear whether constructivism can support any normative proposition over its negation. 
 Valerie Tiberius argues that evaluative properties are conferred upon things on the 
basis of wise evaluative judgments. Furthermore, we can understand these judgments on the 
basis of the common-sensical goals of wisdom: to decide well, to help well, and to develop 
skills required for wisdom. Achieving these goals requires overcoming biases, humility, 
openmindedness, empathy, reflectiveness and so on.  
 James Lenman’s article attempts to show that Street’s constructivism becomes more 
plausible when it is combined with metaethical expressivism. Street makes the valuable 
observation that we can evaluate our evaluative judgments from the perspective of our other 
evaluative judgments. However, according to Lenman, saying this does not require claiming 
that evaluative judgments are unanalysable and basic. Rather, we can understand them as 
desire-like attitudes to treat certain considerations as action-guiding in the familiar 
expressivist way. 
 In the last article of the collection, T.M. Scanlon investigates what is distinctive about 
constructivism by considering constructivist views in mathematics. In this domain, first-order 
judgments about what the subject matter is often leave no interesting questions about the truth 
of these judgments or how we can know them to be true. Oftentimes, these first-order 
judgments specify a procedure that can be used to construct the objects of the domain. 
Scanlon argues that such views do not work when it comes to what reasons we have. The 
suggested procedures for determining what reasons we have either fail to give us substantive 
enough answers or their practical significance becomes questionable. However, once reasons 
are on the scene, there is room for constructivist views about justice and morality that begin 
from the first-order views about reasons. 
 Let me first emphasise that all these articles are of the highest possible quality. They 
are all state of the art papers by a group of leading metaethicists who have already made 
significant contributions to debates about constructivism. In the foreseeable future, anyone 
writing on constructivism will need to study these articles closely in the same way as anyone 
writing on practical reason still needs to use the articles in Garrett Cullity’s and Berys Gaut’s 
wonderful Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) collection.  
 Despite this, I can also offer few minor criticisms. Firstly, the title of the collection is 
misleading. The articles do not discuss constructivism in practical philosophy more generally. 
There are no articles on constructivism in ethical theory, political philosophy, aesthetics, and 
so on. Rather, the articles narrowly focus on constructivism in the theory of metanormativity 
– that is, in the investigation of what it is for a consideration to be a reason.  
 Secondly, many of the articles are written in an unnecessarily complicated, abstract 
and technical way. Let me just give one example from James Lenman’s article “Expressivism 
and Constructivism”, which by no means is the worst in this respect. Lenman states his view 
in the following way (218): 
 
REASON: To think of a consideration C a reason in favour of someone’s φ-ing is to 
favour that consideration guiding deliberation and action in furtherance of concerns, 
desires, and aims to which it speaks in virtue of it and they being able to withstand 
scrutiny in the light of reasons. 
 
No matter how many times I read this, I still fail to grasp the view. When Lenman himself 
asks ‘What does [REASON] tell us?’, his own answer is ‘I think what it tells us is a bit 
complicated (221).’ Indeed.  
Joking aside, I worry that the complexity and technicality of the writing in this 
collection is a symptom of a deeper problem. It has become evident that it is not clear what 
constructivism is and how it differs from other metaethical views. After all, this is the whole 
raison d’être of this collection. However, if there is no real clear fact of the matter of what 
constructivism is, then we cannot blame the authors for expressing their thoughts on the topic 
in such a complex and opaque ways. There just wasn’t anything to be more clear about, 
which itself is a problem for constructivism. On the other hand, if there is a clear alternative 
in ethics which we can call constructivism, the authors could have put a little more effort to 
describing this position in simpler terms. 
My final negative comment about the collection concerns the way in which the 
articles of the collection are related to one another. Perhaps this is a reason for why I prefer 
articles to be published in general philosophical journals over a longer period of time rather 
than a large number of articles on the same topic appearing at the same time in a single 
collection. For one, there is significant overlap between the articles. A number of articles 
explain that Street, for example, fails to account for the content of our judgments about 
reasons. Secondly, some of the articles seem to me to provide knock-down arguments against 
the views put forward in the other articles. For example, Hussain’s critical discussion of 
coherentism in the theory of truth seems to present a decisive problem for Dorsey’s 
coherentist constructivism.  
However, despite these minor issues, I can wholeheartedly recommend this collection 
for everyone who is interested in constructivism and the nature of normativity more 
generally.  
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